Layer 2 · In depth
Roadmap 2026-2036 - the sequence, the costs and the scorecard
The phased order of work from now to 2036, anchored to the January 2027 constitutional amendment, the November 2029 graduation deadline and the 2031 election; the tradeoff ledger, how far growth can realistically move, and the full measurable scorecard.
On this page
- The short version
- Fixed dates in the calendar
- The phased sequence
- What moves in each phase
- What each phase contains, by area
- Compact mechanisms in the phases
- Investments that run alongside every phase
- Foundational learning
- Women’s work
- Health, nutrition and the physical drags
- Power and cooling
- Climate and demography
- Civic life
- The tradeoff ledger
- How far the needle can move
- Four views side by side
- Three scenarios
- The full measurable scorecard
- Quantified indicators and aspirational targets
- Indicators by area (baselines with observation years where known)
- Process and political indicators (yes or no, or published and dated)
- Compact indicators
- Twelve-month watch list
- What is uncertain here
This page is the detailed reasoning behind what to watch and the order of work in the path forward. The deals themselves are on strategy and deals; the macro outlook and the government’s targets are on targets and outlook.
The short version
Order matters more than breadth. A country with limited administrative capacity cannot do everything at once. The sequence starts with what has a sponsor and an outside anchor (banks, energy arrears, the 2029 graduation deadline and the constitutional insurance deal in January 2027), runs a measured pilot of the extortion and youth package alongside, and brings in tax fairness, civil-service accountability and the slower investments (learning, women’s work, migration skills, cooling) as credibility builds. Expect little growth payoff before 2029, and say so: the period when the plan is most likely to be abandoned is FY27-28, when bank resolution and austerity cost growth in the short run.
Fixed dates in the calendar
| When | What | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| 31 March 2027 | Offshore gas bid round closes (extended from 30 November 2026) | Domestic gas runs out around 2036 without new finds1 |
| January-February 2027 | IMF programme talks expected to end (new programme of about $4.5-5bn under negotiation) | Anchor for bank and revenue reform; the Finance Minister says there is no plan to walk away and is trying to fit conditions to the five-year plan2 |
| January 2027 (conditional) | Constitutional amendment expected to be tabled by the government’s own committee; the date is a planning assumption, not confirmed | The window for the insurance pact (deal 2); if it slips, use the fallback below3 |
| March 2027 | IMF baseline has the Strait of Hormuz reopening | External energy and remittance risk4 |
| Spring 2027 | EU garment orders for the season | Early signal of buyer shifts ahead of 20295 |
| July 2027, then 2028 | Public pay-scale phases and allowances | Chance to attach asset declarations and service standards6 |
| November 2029 | LDC graduation (deferred from 24 November 2026 by the UN General Assembly on 29-30 October 2026); starts each market’s transition clock | The anchor for the export compact; EU access continues about three more years, other markets differ7 |
| About 2030 | Working-age share of the population reported to peak | Window to move up the value chain before the dependency ratio rises (a proposal; unverified)8 |
| 2031 | Next general election | Test of whether rules survive a change or renewal of government |
| About 2036 | Domestic gas runs out without new finds | Energy diversification is dated, not distant1 |
The phased sequence
The work falls into four phases. How fast growth recovers is covered in how far the needle can move.
- Now to mid-2027Stop the slide
- Straight story: emergency declared, bank losses published, targets the forecasts support
- Banking reform commission, bankruptcy bill, IMF programme
- Energy: arrears netted, contracts published, gas drilling restarted
- Insurance pact: the January 2027 amendment if it proceeds, otherwise the ordinary-law fallback
- Later pay phases tied to asset disclosure
- Mid-2027 to 2028Build the engine
- One settlement window; weak banks resolved
- Tariff glide path begins; port and customs targets; EU and Japan deals
- Extortion and cadre pilots in zones and on highways; hall seats by public list
- Phone-tax and madrasa add-on pilots
- Local elections; party-finance law; foundational learning rollout
- 2029 to 2031Cross the graduation deadline
- LDC graduation in November 2029; trade access secured before each market's transition ends
- Tax take rising; tariffs near peers
- Scale what pilots proved; drop what failed
- Export support tied to performance
- 2031 election under neutral rules
- 2031 to 2036Lock in and compound
- Peaceful handover or renewed mandate
- Courts, police and local government deepen
- Education and women's work show up in output
- Spending on learning and health rises as revenue allows
What moves in each phase
| Phase | What moves | Which forces rotate or gain weight | What to measure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Now to mid-2027 | Credibility; the banking process starts; rules for losing power | Party leaders begin to tip (insurance); Finance Ministry and central bank gain weight; outside partners engaged | IMF programme agreed; bank losses published; amendment content; inflation; reserves |
| Mid-2027 to 2028 | Credit starts to flow to good firms; export costs fall; extortion measured for the first time | Large borrowers rotate (window closes); exporters and small firms gain weight; cadres offered another route in pilot areas | Bad-loan ratio; private credit growth; port dwell time; extortion survey; apprenticeships filled; number of banks |
| 2029 to 2031 | Economy passes the graduation deadline with new access and a wider tax base | Exporters, women workers and migrants gain weight; officials rotate if pay conditions held | Non-garment export share; women’s employment; tax as share of GDP; youth share in non-farm work; share of migrants who are skilled |
| 2031 to 2036 | Rules survive a change or renewal of government | The system’s time horizon lengthens, which is the point of the whole exercise | Whether the handover was peaceful; investment as share of GDP; learning outcomes |
What each phase contains, by area
The items below name each piece of work and link to its design. Where timing is uncertain, the more cautious reading is used.
Phase 1: stop the slide (to mid-2027, with some items running to 2028).
- Banks: the commission, bankruptcy law and settlement window (Deal 1).
- Fiscal and monetary credibility: the straight story, central bank independence, tax before rates, targeted transfers (step zero).
- Extortion on farm-to-market routes: mobile anti-extortion units on highways and in wholesale markets (Deal 4).
- Politics: the amendment planned for January 2027, if it proceeds (otherwise the ordinary-law fallback, see below), and the party-finance law (Deal 2); hall-seat portal and paid placements (Deal 4).
Phase 2: build the engine (mid-2027 to 2028).
- Trade, zones, ports and power: tariff glide path, bonded access, five working zones, port targets, energy contracts (Deal 5 and step zero).
- State capacity: tax and VAT digitisation, civil-service reform and the police commission (Deal 3); the pilots of deals 4, 6 and 7.
- Courts: commercial courts and mediation (supporting reforms).
Phase 3: cross the graduation deadline (2029 to 2031).
- Trade access secured before each market’s transition ends (for the EU, about November 2032 on the stated graduation date, but GSP+ eligibility and rules of origin must be secured earlier; other markets differ); tax toward 10% of GDP; tariff structure converged toward peers; three to five zones at full operation; performance-conditioned export support for the first time (only once bank supervision and auditable data exist); migration cost cuts and skills certification; scale what pilots proved and drop what failed.
- The 2031 election under caretaker rules is the test of everything above.
Phase 4: lock in and compound (2031 to 2036).
- The reforms must survive a change or renewal of government. Fiscal decentralisation to elected local bodies; a professionalised civil service; an independent investigation service; personal-law reform debated as incomes rise; infrastructure and climate adaptation at scale; diversification into man-made fibre, light engineering, pharmaceuticals and electronics assembly; bank credit toward 60-70% of GDP (a judgement target, not sourced).
Our recommended phasing, and the alternatives
We recommend the cautious path above. Reasonable alternatives differ on four points. - Speed of recovery. One alternative has growth above 5.5% by 2028 and about 7% by 2030; ours is about 3% through FY28 and 4-5% by FY29-30. We follow the cautious path (see below). - Prosecutions. An alternative puts a first wave of high-profile anti-corruption prosecutions, including some from the governing coalition, in 2028-2032; independent investigations and properly brought proceedings run alongside the economic pilots, and political convenience never determines their timing; we put pilots and islands first only for administrative reforms (see strategy and deals). - Personal-freedom zones and cultural opening. An alternative sets three zones in 2028-29 and a “cultural opening” in 2030-36; we defer social liberalisation and treat zones as an option. - Student reform. An alternative bans party-affiliated student wings nationwide immediately; we separate party machinery from campuses, protect autonomous student unions and leave campus depoliticisation to the 2-5 year band.
Compact mechanisms in the phases
The ground rules become practice through a few mechanisms, set out in the compact across differences. Milestones are relative to adoption by a sponsor (a government, a parliamentary committee or a cross-party group), not to calendar dates, because the political dates are assumptions.
| Mechanism | Phase | Adoption-relative milestone |
|---|---|---|
| Common baseline of bank and fiscal risks, jobs, trade exposure, service reliability and case delays, with series, limits and verifier named | Stop the slide | Published within 90 days of adoption |
| Cross-party minimum compact: a short document on neutral economic institutions, safe political competition and no coercion or extortion, endorsed by government, opposition, business, labour and civic or religious voices | Stop the slide | Alongside the constitutional changes, whenever they are tabled |
| Compact scorecard, published quarterly by independent bodies, scoring government and opposition alike | Stop the slide, then continuing | First issue within the first two quarters after adoption |
| Pilots (“islands”): a bank and budget credibility package, one trade corridor, fair access to study and work; each with a review date, cost ceiling, primary outcome, safeguards and independent evaluation under ordinary staffing | Build the engine | Budgeted pilots run in months 4-12 after adoption; public review at the end; scale only if benefits persist |
| Consultation that has consequences: a standing forum with published mandate, rotating representation, written submissions and published responses; the forum advises and Parliament, agencies and courts decide | Build the engine | Mandate published within the first year; a pre-announced timetable for impasses |
| Handover records: a public inventory of commitments, liabilities, contracts, pilot findings and pending reviews, with lawful protection for sensitive data | Cross the graduation deadline and lock in | Before each general election; review of the compact after each election, including commitments the incoming government intends to revise |
If the January 2027 amendment slips
The compact does not depend on one amendment. If constitutional changes are delayed, diluted or fail, the fallback is the parts that need only ordinary law or existing powers: the baseline, scorecard and pilots; public hearings and committee scrutiny; transparent appointment standards; a handover inventory; and a police commission or prosecution service by ordinary law. The constitutional items then become the first agenda item of the next review.
Two safeguards apply in every phase: restrictions on rights must be lawful, necessary and proportionate, and peaceful protest and lawful claims that delay projects are protected; successors may revise policy lawfully and transparently, and “timely” justice never means that victims’ claims expire or that officeholders gain immunity.
Investments that run alongside every phase
These matter more for the long run than most of the deals, but they pay slowly. They start early so that they are ready when the deals have bought the space.
Foundational learning
Access is near-universal (about 2% of primary-age children are out of school); learning is not (about 50% of grade 5 pupils are below minimum reading proficiency).9 A three-part package:
- Now: structured pedagogy and remedial teaching (“teaching at the right level”) scaled through the World Bank’s $300m programme in the weakest districts; fill the 66,962 teacher vacancies through audited exams; freeze curriculum changes for five years (the curriculum has flipped twice in four years); publish school-level learning data; mid-day meals in the poorest sub-districts.1 Delay the compulsory third language from Grade 6 until foundational reading is fixed.
- Next (2-5 years): a teacher career ladder linking pay to certification; a Higher Education Commission with performance-based funding and search-committee appointments; rebalance National University humanities intake; vocational training tied to employers (a proposal: hand operation of 100-plus public polytechnics to industry consortia so a two-year technical diploma earns more than a generalist degree on day one); madrasa core curriculum with equivalence tests.
- Later (5-15 years): raise education spending from about 1.4-2% of GDP toward 3.5-4% as revenue allows (the spending baseline is disputed; see the disputed-figures page); vocational spending from under 0.1% toward 0.6%; a research funding body; university autonomy with accountability.
Women’s work
The strongest payoff on the site. Female participation fell from 42.8% to 38.4% on the national definition (21.3% labour-force participation and 19.1% employment-to-population in 2022 on the ILO 19th ICLS definition11).1 The agenda: enforce the child-marriage law with stipends; safe, tracked transport and lighting near industrial zones; affordable working-women hostels; employer childcare (tax-deductible); fast harassment tribunals; transfers paid to women. One plan aims at 43% by 2028, 48% by 2030 and 55% or more by 2036; these are aspirations. Frame the case as family income more than as rights, and keep family-law reform for later.1
Health, nutrition and the physical drags
Public health spending is under 1% of GDP in one source. The sensible priorities are primary clinics, preventive screening and food-safety enforcement, with the target of 2.0-2.5% of GDP in a proposal. The evidence is more nuanced than “everyone is overweight”: about 28.9% of adults are overweight or obese while stunting (24%) and anaemia (44-53% of children and pregnant women) persist, so the double burden is the point.1 The same proposal would shift agricultural support from single-crop rice toward protein, vegetables and cold chains (not evidenced here). A 2022 World Bank climate assessment is reported to cost air pollution at about 9% of GDP in welfare terms (definition of damages not checked here; unverified12), and heat at about 0.3-0.4% of GDP in 2024 (different methods; they cannot be added together).
Power and cooling
Cut costly idle-capacity payments, auction utility-scale solar and rooftop net-metering as oil-fired peaking contracts expire, and consider regional hydropower from Nepal and Bhutan via India after 2030 (a proposal; a long-lead item). Cheap adaptation: reflective “cool roofs” on factories, schools and hospitals, shade trees and canal restoration in dense cities, early-morning shifts for outdoor work, efficient fans that could cut peak demand by up to 2,590 MW, and factory cooling (an estimated $239m of total capital cost across the sector, about 0.2% of 2025 apparel export revenue per year if spread over three years; payback about three years)14. (Heat facts and the capacity correction are in circular dependencies.) One scorecard target is renewables rising from 2.3% of power to 10% by 2028, 22% by 2030 and 40% by 2036; that is aspirational.
Climate and demography
Climate adaptation (polders, relocation strategy, water management, resilient infrastructure) and the closing demographic window shape every phase. They have been covered only lightly in this research and are named here so that they are not forgotten (see gaps).
Civic life
One plan argues that investment in libraries, parks, sports, cinema and music across all districts, and independent cultural spaces, would raise creativity and give young people healthy outlets. This is a reasonable quality-of-life goal, but no measured growth payoff is available, so it is not placed in the critical path.
The tradeoff ledger
Every meaningful reform creates short-term losers. Ignoring them is why plans die on shelves. This ledger merges the costs listed in the deal table with the losers, likely resistance and mitigations from the phased plans.
| Strategic move | Who loses in the short term | How they might resist | Mitigation or buy-in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bank clean-up, settlement window and stay-order rule | Large defaulters and former owners; lawyers whose fees rise with delay; taxpayers (civil debt relief for settlers, without immunity from investigation, and public money) | Media campaigns, injunctions, lobbying MPs, extending the window | Ring-fence depositors; paid mediation fees for lawyers; one hard-dated window; publish who pays; keep the IMF and public spotlight on defaulters |
| Insurance pact (amendment) | Today’s rulers (the same fair-process guarantees apply to them if they lose power; no immunity); parties that gain from the status quo | A hollow amendment; opposition boycott | Put in items both sides already accept; opposition chairs; narrower fallback by ordinary law |
| Pay for accountability, faceless tax, deemed approvals | Clerks and officials who gain from discretion | “Pen-down” strikes, slowdowns | Keep base pay safe; team bonuses; limited retirement package for senior staff who cannot adapt |
| Cadre-to-career and legal party money | Cadres; local MPs; taxpayers (public money to parties) | Campus clashes, strikes, taking funding while collections continue | Pilot first; published quarterly extortion survey; condition funding on audits and dissolving armed wings |
| Tariff glide path and export compact | Protected domestic firms; tariff-dependent revenue; exporters (higher labour costs) | Claims of local-industry destruction and job loss | Predictable three-year schedule; cheap imported inputs; retooling credit; replacement revenue first |
| Small-business compact | The state (lower tax rates at first); informal collectors | Protection fails and the tax becomes another collection | Response-time targets; pilot |
| Madrasa compact | People concerned about state funding of religious institutions; women (deferral of family-law reform) | Boards take money and refuse testing | Voluntary add-ons; funding per tested student; red lines on violence |
| Free-of-moral-policing zones | Those who see them as against local culture | Street protests alleging “anti-Islamic” culture | Option, not commitment; run alongside the madrasa compact; quiet backing from moderate scholars and business elders |
| Ending blanket fuel and power subsidies | Middle and upper-income consumers; the poor if transfers lag | Public anger at bills | Targeted digital transfers first; visible rooftop solar savings within about 24 months |
| Foundational learning, teacher pay conditionality | Teacher associations; coaching industry | Strikes (as in 2025), curriculum reversals | Pay tied to certification; publish school-level data; do not change the curriculum for five years |
How far the needle can move
In the vector picture of the incentive map, the plan aims at three things by 2031: to tip the centre (party leaders) from neutral to mildly positive, to move the top-left groups (officials, MPs, large borrowers) from negative toward neutral, and to raise the weight of the bottom-right groups (small firms, women, migrants). It does not turn opponents into champions. Neutral is enough, because the economy has strong forces pulling the right way once they are not blocked: a young workforce, a proven export sector, $35bn a year of remittances, and millions of small firms.
What that buys:
Growth ranges (our judgement, not model output)
- FY27-FY28: growth near 3%, about the same as without reform. Bank resolution and austerity cost growth in the short run. This is the period when the plan is most likely to be abandoned.
- FY29-FY30: 4-5% if credit has restarted and trade deals are in place before preferences are withdrawn.
- Early 2030s: 5-6% on a sounder base, with more of it reaching wages because more of the jobs are formal. These are rough ranges. The government’s real-growth goal of 8.5% by FY31 is outside them. The $1 trillion goal for 2034 is a dollar-size target, so real growth alone cannot rule it out: from about $506bn in 2026 it needs dollar GDP to grow 8.9% a year for eight years (our arithmetic), which depends on real growth plus domestic inflation minus taka depreciation. The IMF’s path has real growth under 3%, inflation near 11% in FY27 and a taka sliding from about 123 to nearly 160 per dollar by FY31, so reaching the target that way would mean most of the “growth” is price rises, not output.10 A decade of 5-6% growth that is real, and that people believe, would still be worth more than a decade of 7% on paper.
Four views side by side
| Source | FY27 | FY28 | FY29-30 | Early 2030s | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IMF (October 2026) | 3.2% | 2.2% | below 3% a year into the next decade | below 3% | Forecast without reform4 |
| World Bank | 3.4% | 3.9% | n/a | n/a | Forecast10 |
| Moody’s (as reported; unverified) | 4.3% | about 4.9% from FY28 | about 4.9% | n/a | Forecast, as reported5 |
| Our judgement | about 3% | about 3% | 4-5% | 5-6% | With reform; best realistic case |
| One plan’s scorecard | n/a | 5.5% or more | 6.8-7.2% | 7.5% or more | Aspiration, not forecast |
| Government | 6.5% target | n/a | n/a | 8.5% by FY31; $1 trillion by 2034 | Target10 |
Which growth path?
The aspirational scorecard (5.5% or more in 2028) is inconsistent with the IMF and World Bank forecasts and with the time reform takes to reach credit and investment. A stabilisation-and-rebound reading from a prominent economist is that 2027 and 2028 are years of stabilisation and a more substantial rebound comes only between 2028 and 2030.5 We therefore use the more cautious path as the base and show the aspirational figures as aspirations only.
Three scenarios
One set of scenarios has probabilities that are judgement (unverified): a stagflationary plateau (55%: growth 3.2-4.3% through FY28, inflation 8-11%, banking resolution slow and partial, a new IMF programme providing a floor but not a surge), a confidence break (30%: an energy shock, a politicised central bank or a failed bank resolution triggers taka pressure and a deeper investment freeze) and a reform-led rebound (15%: credible loss recognition, revenue toward 10-11% of GDP, stable gas contracts and a realistic IMF programme take growth to 5-6% by 2029-30). Our growth ranges are a little more cautious on timing than the rebound case.5
The full measurable scorecard
To prevent “great plans, zero execution”, progress should be tracked on a public, independent quarterly dashboard managed by the statistics bureau (reformed as an independent statutory body), the central bank and civil-society think tanks.15 Two tables follow. The first holds the quantified targets from one plan; its 2028, 2030 and 2036 columns are aspirations, not forecasts, and the baselines are from that plan unless footnoted (many are disputed; see disputed figures and key statistics).
Quantified indicators and aspirational targets
| Dimension | Late-2026 baseline | 2028 | 2030 | 2036 | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Real GDP growth | about 3.4% (WB) to 4.14% (BBS), FY26 | 5.5% or more | 6.8-7.2% | 7.5% or more | Our realistic range is far lower (see above) |
| Average inflation | about 8.7-9.2% | below 6% | below 4.5% | 3.5-4.5% | IMF expects 10.9% in FY27 |
| Gross bank bad-loan ratio | 32.78% | below 15% (after a bad-bank carve-out) | below 8% | below 4% | Facts on the banking page |
| Tax-to-GDP | 6.8% (NBR 6.78% in FY26) | 9.5% | 11.5% | 14-15% | Our judgement: toward 10% by 2031 |
| Net FDI inflow | about $1.4bn a year (run rate) | $3.0bn | $6.0bn or more | $10-15bn or more | 2025 inflow about $1.8bn on another source |
| Non-garment share of exports | about 16-19% | 23% | 30% | 45% or more | Garments are 80-85% of exports |
| Renewable share of power | 2.3% | 10% | 22% | 40% or more | Includes regional hydro |
| Education and health spending, % of GDP | 1.5% and under 1.0% | 2.4% and 1.3% | 3.2% and 1.8% | 4.0% and 2.5% | Education baseline disputed (1.39-2%) |
| Female labour-force participation (national definition) | 38.4% | 43% | 48% | 55% or more | ILO 19th ICLS participation was 21.3% in 2022 (employment-to-population 19.1%) |
| Court case backlog | 4.85 million | 4.2 million | 3.0 million | below 1.5 million | Another count: about 4.0m lower courts plus 0.69m Supreme Court |
Indicators by area (baselines with observation years where known)
Several baselines are older proxies or one-off estimates; they are labelled. Sources are in the footnotes and on the sources page.13
| Area | Indicator | Baseline |
|---|---|---|
| Banks | Bad-loan ratio; capital adequacy; private credit growth; number of banks | about 33% (June 2026); -2.6% (World Bank, 2026); 4.5% (lowest in 33 years; 2026); 61 banks |
| Public finance | NBR tax-to-GDP; interest as share of revenue | 6.78% (FY26); 27.5% in FY25 heading toward about two-fifths by FY31 (IMF projection) |
| Trade | Tariffs on intermediates (average and with para-tariffs); non-garment export share; Chattogram dwell time; FDI as share of GDP | 18.8% and about 29% (World Bank 2022 memorandum); non-garment share 16-19% (year not given in source); 8.3-11 days (year not given in source); about 0.3% (2025 inflow) |
| Energy | Capacity charges; idle capacity | Tk 420bn (FY25); 7,700-9,500 MW excess (review committee; year not given in source) |
| Learning | Learning poverty; learning-adjusted years of school; graduate unemployment; skilled share of migrant outflow; budget execution | 51% (World Bank brief, 2022 data); 6.0 (2020 Human Capital Index, a historical proxy); 12% (2022); 19.1% (2025); education budget use fell from 111% to 88% (reported for FY26) |
| Politics | Police commission with real powers in force; share of top police appointments by commission panel; political detainees; constraints-on-government rank; single-bid share in e-procurement; local bodies with elected heads | none as of 18 October 2026; n/a; HRW says hundreds (2026); 115 of 143 (World Justice Project, year not given in source); 20.7% (TIB e-GP report, year not given in source); n/a |
| Courts | Pending cases by tier; median commercial-case disposal; contract enforcement days; undertrial share; civil-justice rank | see above; n/a; 1,442 days (Doing Business 2020, a historical proxy); 74% (reported 2026); 132 (World Justice Project, rank, year not checked) |
| Freedom and gender | Child marriage under 18; female labour-force participation on the ILO definition (2022); arrests under speech laws; mob killings (one agreed series); Cato personal-freedom score; press-freedom rank | 47.2% (a 63% figure also circulates); 21.3% participation, 19.1% employment-to-population (2022); n/a; 40 (government) vs 171-187 (rights groups), Jan-Sep 2026; 5.16; 152 |
Process and political indicators (yes or no, or published and dated)
- IMF programme agreed (target: talks end January-February 2027).
- Bank-by-bank losses published.
- Contents of the January 2027 amendment (term limit, caretaker, Article 70, opposition deputy speaker, oversight chairs).
- Settlement window opened, closed on its date, and not extended.
- Quarterly extortion survey of firms and transport operators published (none exists today).
- Apprenticeships and placements filled in pilot zones.
- Wage-setting rule announced and the garment wage board outcome after the 1 November 2026 walkout.
- Handover or renewal of government in 2031 peaceful.
Compact indicators
| Question | Indicator | How to avoid a misleading result |
|---|---|---|
| Is the law applied equally? | World Justice Project Rule of Law Index score and rank (see the canonical row on key statistics)16 and its sub-scores; share of arrests and cases with written reasons and appeal | Higher complaint counts may mean greater confidence in reporting; pair counts with surveys and case outcomes |
| Is losing power safe? | Opposition participation and oversight roles; arbitrary detention or reprisal reports; whether successors could take office and govern | Check by affiliation; protect identities |
| Is peaceful disagreement protected? | Peaceful assemblies facilitated or restricted with reasons; mob and coercion incidents on a single agreed series; arrests under speech laws | Use one agreed series, not rival counts |
| Are costs and gains shared fairly? | Real earnings, poverty and employment by sex, age and region; who bears the cost of each reform | Explain survey frequency and revisions |
| Is justice timely and fair? | Time to hearing, reasoned decisions, victim and witness support, reparations paid | Do not use conviction or arrest quotas |
| Are numbers open and mistakes corrected? | Share of major reforms with a published cost, owner, timetable and review date; pilots closed or revised on evidence; sunsets honoured | Count extensions explicitly |
Twelve-month watch list
For the next twelve months, a short set to watch is on what to watch. It adds the macro indicators from the most recent summary: the bank-resolution test at Sammilito Islami Bank (about Tk 80,000 crore paid and about Tk 100,000 crore more cited), the size and realism of IMF conditions, monetary credibility (crawling peg; remittances and reserves as a trust meter), energy (terminal reliability, gas allocation, petroleum import bill), budget execution, jobs data (wage index, labour force survey, household income and expenditure survey) and garment orders for spring 2027.5
What is uncertain here
- All growth ranges, the “after” scores in the incentive map and the feasibility ratings are judgement. Several scorecard targets are the aspirations of one plan and are not checked against capacity.
- The cost of each deal is unknown except for the bank clean-up and the pay scale.
- Some baselines are disputed or from sources that could not be verified; they are marked in the tables and on the disputed figures page.
- Agriculture, climate, health systems, urbanisation and automation in garments were outside most of the research; they need their own pages in later iterations.
-
World Bank learning poverty PDF; Daily Star, budget education outlay; UNICEF, data on the situation of children; UN Women, gender lens; gas outlook: Financial Express, offshore bid docs. ↩↩↩↩↩↩
-
BSS, IMF talks, 15 November 2026; ThePrint, Bangladesh seeks fresh $4.5 billion IMF loan. ↩
-
Prothom Alo, constitutional amendment committee. ↩
-
Jyoti Rahman, A State of Economic Emergency, Counterpoint, 20 October 2026. ↩↩
-
Unverified: no primary source located (Moody’s figures and scenario probabilities from an unverified summary). ↩↩↩↩↩
-
Financial Express, phased pay-scale rollout; Dhaka Tribune, ninth pay scale. ↩
-
Prothom Alo, LDC graduation deferred to November 2029 (30 October in one report, 29 October in another). ↩
-
Unverified: no primary source located (demographic window peaking about 2030). ↩
-
World Bank, learning poverty brief. ↩
-
Jyoti Rahman’s reading of the IMF in A State of Economic Emergency; Prothom Alo on the World Bank, FY26 outlook; government targets: Financial Express, development strategy targeting a $1 trillion economy by 2034; 2026 GDP of about $506bn: Artha Kagaj (in Bengali, via the diagnosis pass). ↩↩↩
-
Gender-lens presentation on the state of the economy, State of the Economy from a Gender Lens, p. 4; UN Women, gender lens. ↩
-
World Bank, urgent climate action crucial for Bangladesh, 31 October 2022 (the 9% figure and its definition were not re-checked). ↩
-
World Bank, learning poverty brief (2022 data); World Bank, Doing Business 2020, Bangladesh; other baselines as footnoted in the research listed in
sources. ↩ -
Cornell ILR Global Labour Institute, Six seasons, four summers: executive summary, September 2026, p. 2; just-style, factory cooling. ↩
-
Unverified: no primary source located for the scorecard baselines and targets (one plan’s figures). ↩
-
World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index. ↩
Go deeper
- Key statisticsData & sourcesThe important figures from the research, grouped by theme in tables, each with its value, date, source and link. Where sources disagree, see the disputed-figures ledger.
- Disputed figuresData & sourcesThe ledger of figures where our sources disagree, with both values, the likely reason and how this site handles each, plus a list of known gaps.
- SourcesData & sourcesThe consolidated bibliography of every external source cited in our research, grouped by type and deduplicated, with the links as given.
Summarised in
Where this comes from
Synthesised from 9 research reports, checked against the sources cited above and reviewed before publication. How we work · All sources.