Layer 2

In depth

The detailed research and reasoning behind each finding, with the evidence laid out.

The economy in late 2026

Growth, prices, trade, investment, public finance, jobs, sectors and trade preferences, with the sources and the points where sources disagree.

The banking crisis

The facts of Bangladesh's banking crisis - how many loans are bad, where they are concentrated, the 2026 bank buy-back law and its repeal, who pays, and why trust in the central bank matters.

What the numbers miss

Six things a standard economic dashboard does not show - overstated past growth, jobs moving back to farms, a country whose main export is its people, concentrated credit, a private tax of extortion, and politics as a business - plus the measurement problems behind them.

The state and its institutions

The political reset of 2026, what happened to the July Charter reforms, and the condition of Parliament, courts, police, the civil service and the rule of law, with the numbers and where they disagree.

Root causes

A first-principles diagnosis of why Bangladesh's progress has stalled - making versus taking, four layers of explanation, corruption as a pattern of incentives, norms and hierarchy, human capital and organisational quality, and the thinkers and comparisons behind each claim.

Culture and religion

A careful, evidence-only look at whether culture or religious conservatism explains Bangladesh's economic outcomes - eleven specific propositions tested one by one, what is causal, what is correlation and what is opinion.

Education and skills

What children learn, how teachers and universities are chosen, what graduates earn and do, and where the madrasa stream fits, with the figures and the points where sources disagree.

A compact across differences

The reasoning behind the seven ground rules - four starting principles and how each was refined, comparisons with other countries, overlapping consensus, the mechanisms that could make a compact real, and where it could fail.

  • Four starting principles proposed for discussion were tested; each has a real strength and a specific weakness, and each was refined, not dropped.
  • Other countries lowered the stakes of disagreement with different tools; none can be copied whole, and none proves that one institution caused growth.
  • A compact on paper is not enough: it needs referees, a safe way to lose, visible results, a scorecard and pilots that are evaluated honestly.
  • It could fail by entrenching established organisations, capturing its own oversight bodies, rewarding holdouts, splitting under hardship or succeeding only in pilots.

Heat, air, health and energy for cooling

The physical drags on productivity - rising heat, polluted air, poor nutrition and costly health care - what the evidence shows, which common claims hold up, and where the numbers disagree.

History and comparisons

Where Bangladesh started in 1972, how it caught up on a narrow model, and how its income, health and education compare with India, Pakistan, Vietnam, West Bengal and others.

What Bangladeshi analysts say

The main views of Bangladesh-focused economists, think tanks and researchers, grouped by theme - the kind of crisis, banks, trust, the growth model, politics, trade and tax - with where they agree and differ.

Circular dependencies and where to cut them

Bangladesh's problems feed each other in loops, so fixing one alone tends to fail. Ten loops, how they connect, and the links that are cheapest and most promising to cut first.

  • Problems that feed each other cannot be fixed one at a time; any reform that touches only one link is pulled back by the others.
  • Ten loops are described here, merged from several analyses; three of them (banks, party money and extortion, winner-take-all politics) are the most urgent.
  • The best links to cut first are the cheapest ones that someone powerful gains from cutting, backed by an outside deadline.
  • Motivation and culture follow visible rewards for skill more than they lead them, so the loops are entered through jobs and credit, not through lectures.

Who wants what - the incentive map

Every group that matters for Bangladesh's economy acts sensibly on what it is paid for today. A profile of nineteen groups, a power-and-direction map, and what could change each group's payoffs.

  • Each group is behaving sensibly given what it is paid for; the task is to change the payoffs, not to appeal to goodwill.
  • Groups are scored by power and by direction (do they pull toward or against a more productive economy). The scores are our judgement, not measurements.
  • Some of the groups pulling hardest the right way (women workers, migrants, small firms) have the least power; the most powerful actor sits in the middle and can tip either way.
  • Status, belonging and belief move people as well as money, so some of the cheapest levers are not financial.

Strategy - nine deals and the order to do them in

A plan built as exchanges. Each deal gives a group something it values for a change in behaviour that makes production pay better than taking. Design rules, nine deals with their prices, the hardest four in detail, and what not to do.

  • The plan is a set of deals, each giving a group something it values in exchange for a change that raises the return to making things or lowers the return to taking them.
  • The order matters more than the list: tell the straight story, resolve the banks, make losing power safe in January 2027, use the November 2029 graduation deadline, and pilot the untested deals with published numbers.
  • Every deal has a price and a risk, stated openly; each should leave a rule behind, not a private favour.
  • A version of the bad-debt deal has already been tried and repealed within five months; the lessons are built into the design here.

Roadmap 2026-2036 - the sequence, the costs and the scorecard

The phased order of work from now to 2036, anchored to the January 2027 constitutional amendment, the November 2029 graduation deadline and the 2031 election; the tradeoff ledger, how far growth can realistically move, and the full measurable scorecard.

  • Four phases: stop the slide (to mid-2027), build the engine (to 2028), cross the graduation deadline (2029-2031) and lock in (2031-2036).
  • Expect little growth payoff before 2029; the realistic best case is about 3% through FY28, 4-5% in FY29-30 and 5-6% in the early 2030s. Higher targets in some research are aspirations, not forecasts.
  • Every reform has short-term losers; the tradeoff ledger names them and says how each could be bought in.
  • A public quarterly scorecard, produced by bodies the government does not control, is part of the plan.

Targets and outlook

The government's targets ($1 trillion by 2034, 8.5% growth by FY31, 10 million jobs) set against the forecasts, a realistic range for growth, and the scenarios for the next five years.

Objections, critique and what remains unknown

The strongest arguments against the plan and what survives each, the political-feasibility weakness, proposals examined from earlier work, the tests any one-cause explanation must pass, and the gaps in the evidence.

  • The weakest part of the plan is who carries it out: it asks the most powerful actor in the system to change the system, and confidence in political feasibility is low.
  • What survives best is the ordering (candour and banks first), the use of outside deadlines and the habit of piloting untested deals with published numbers.
  • Earlier proposals on freedom, anti-corruption and electoral design were examined against comparative evidence; the aims hold, the mechanisms were sharpened.
  • Many things are still unmeasured: the size of extortion, party finance, madrasa graduates' earnings, and the true size of GDP.