Layer 2 · In depth

The state and its institutions

The political reset of 2026, what happened to the July Charter reforms, and the condition of Parliament, courts, police, the civil service and the rule of law, with the numbers and where they disagree.

Updated 21 Nov 2026 · 13 min read

On this page
  1. The 2026 election and referendum
  2. What happened to the reforms
  3. How power is concentrated
  4. Violence and freedoms
  5. Courts and the law
  6. Police
  7. The civil service and public services
  8. What people say (opinion surveys)
  9. Student politics and campuses
  10. Existing laws
  11. Gaps
  12. Surveillance, data and online content

This page records the facts about the state. The explanation of why institutions behave as they do is on Root causes. The incentives of each group (the police, the civil service, judges, the military) are on Group incentives. Proposals are on Strategy and deals.

In one paragraph

Bangladesh has had a political reset without yet having an institutional one. A new government with a large majority took office after the 12 February 2026 election. The interim government’s laws on judicial appointments, the Supreme Court secretariat and anti-corruption oversight, which were intended to make those bodies more independent of the executive, were repealed or lapsed. The police commission ordinance was criticised by TIB as failing to create an independent body and as preserving government influence, and the constitutional reforms promised in their place are still to come. Courts are slow, policing and public services involve widespread informal payments, and trust in institutions is low. These are descriptions of a system, and previous governments left a similar legacy.

The 2026 election and referendum

Item Result Source
Election date 12 February 2026 Wikipedia; bdnews241
BNP 49.97% of the vote, 209 of 300 elected seats 1
Jamaat-e-Islami 31.77% (also given as 31.8%), 68 seats, its best ever; main opposition 1
National Citizen Party (NCP) 3.05% of the vote; 6 seats (unverified: no primary source located) 1
Awami League barred from the election 1
Same-day referendum on the July Charter endorsed; corrected gazette result 68.26% (47,225,980 yes of 69,186,211 valid votes); early reports varied up to about 70% 2

Seat counts and the referendum share

Al Jazeera reported alliance totals of 212 (BNP) and 77 (Jamaat and allies); the party counts are 209 and 68, and the difference depends on the counting stage and on alliance membership.3 The Election Commission revised results on 26 February; the corrected gazette of 25 February gives 68.26% (Prothom Alo).2 The date of the transfer of power is given as 16 February (one input) and 17 February (another).

The Charter itself grew out of the work of eleven reform commissions under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus (August 2024 to February 2026), which produced 84 reform proposals (unverified; no primary source located); a source cited in the note lists eleven commissions and a six-member banking reform task force).4

What happened to the reforms

  • Ordinances reviewed. Parliament reviewed 133 interim-era ordinances: 110 were approved, 7 repealed and 16 lapsed. Those lost included the ones on judicial appointments, the Supreme Court secretariat, the National Human Rights Commission, enforced disappearance, police reform and anti-corruption oversight.5
  • The judicial ordinances. The repeal on 9 April contradicted the governing party’s own 31-point outline and manifesto, according to the Daily Star and Prothom Alo.67
  • The Constitution Reform Council. The government declined to form the Charter’s council. It is running a 12-member special committee, chaired by the Home Minister, that aims to table an amendment in January 2027. The opposition refused to take its five reserved seats.89 One source cited in the note adds that the government has declared the interim government’s Charter Implementation Order unlawful and that the committee has no submission deadline.4
  • Status on 18 October. No police commission existed, and the anti-corruption commission had reverted to its 2004 law with executive appointment. Caretaker restoration and a 10-year prime-ministerial term limit were promised only through the amendment.10
  • September laws. Laws on human rights, enforced disappearance and the successor to the Rapid Action Battalion (the Special Response Battalion) were criticised by Human Rights Watch for weakening safeguards.11
  • Administrative reform. By February 2026 only 3 of 18 priority administrative recommendations had progressed, and none of 180 local-government recommendations.12
  • Positive moves. Parliament repealed the clause that would have let former owners reacquire distressed banks (The banking crisis). The army is being withdrawn from street policing.13 Ruling-party MPs gave up government plots and duty-free cars, and Parliament abolished the duty-free entitlement.14
  • Personnel. 32 former deputy commissioners, the returning officers of 2018, were sent into compulsory retirement.15 That may be justified accountability, and it also shows that control of the bureaucracy changes hands with power. Human Rights Watch says hundreds of perceived opponents remain in arbitrary detention.11

Judicial reforms: a dated chronology

The judicial-appointments and Supreme Court secretariat ordinances were repealed or lapsed on 9 April 2026 (Al Jazeera; Daily Star). TIB’s statement of that date warned of the repeal and of risks to the Appointments Ordinance, so its warning and the repeal are two stages of one event, not a contradiction.16 Two points remain unsettled: whether the commercial-courts measure (75 specialised courts, 90-day trials) is an ordinance or an Act that survived parliamentary review, and the date of a police commission ordinance approved by the cabinet (BSS).17 The status of the police commission and the anti-corruption commission as at 18 October is in the list above.

How power is concentrated

  • First-past-the-post turned 49.97% of the vote into about 70% of elected seats.1
  • The Prime Minister’s office concentrates executive power. Article 70 of the Constitution automatically unseats an MP who votes against the party, one of the strictest anti-defection rules in the world.18 The 2011 abolition of the caretaker system was passed by what a commentator called “brute parliamentary majority”.19
  • The World Justice Project ranks Bangladesh 115 of 143 on constraints on government powers.20
  • The Police Act of 1861 is still the base law for policing.21

These are descriptions of structure. The explanation in terms of incentives, and the “winner-take-all” argument, are on Root causes.

Violence and freedoms

Item Figure Source
Political violence, Jan-Jun 2026 374 incidents, 66 dead, 113 beaten to death by mobs, 61 jail deaths ASK, via TBS22
Mob killings, Jan-Sep 2026 40 (Home Ministry) to 171-187 (ASK, HRSS) IANS23
Shrine attacks since August 2024 97 attacks, 11 cases filed Daily Star24
Freedom House 2026 44/100, Partly Free Freedom House25
Cato Human Freedom Index 2025 rank 129 of 165; personal freedom 5.16 (Pakistan 5.00, Indonesia 6.47, Malaysia 6.79, Nepal 7.27) Cato26
RSF press freedom 2026 rank 152 Dhaka Tribune27
TI Corruption Perceptions Index 2025 24/100; rank 150 of 182 (TIB) TIB28

The corruption ranking

TIB’s release gives both descriptions: rank 150 of 182 and among the 13 lowest-scoring countries. Tied scores explain why the two conventions differ, so this is not a dispute.29

Two further points. Much of the 2026 violence is mob killings, custodial deaths and clashes within and between ruling and allied camps, not only attacks by an excluded opposition. A reported TIB finding attributing 91% of post-August-2024 violence to one party’s activists is unverified.30 And Human Rights Watch documented at least four arrests in April 2026 for insulting the government; there is no national denominator in the research to say how typical this is.31

The raid at Bhatara in October, in which 85 people (26 of them women) were given summary sentences without drug tests, is documented.3233 One input adds that a daily newspaper published the names, photos and fathers’ identities of those arrested; we could not confirm that. Zia Hassan links the episode to investor confidence (see Voices). Speech and personal-freedom issues are treated further on Culture and religion.

Courts and the law

4.0m to 4.86m
Pending cases
subordinate courts plus about 0.69m in the Supreme Court; sources differ by date
Source: Prothom Alo; Daily Star; unverified
1,442 days
Contract enforcement
cost 66.8% of the claim; rank 189 (Doing Business 2020)
Source: World Bank
1 per 78,000 people
Judges
10-13 per million
Source: Daily Star
74%
Prisoners awaiting trial
prisons at about 1.7 times capacity
Source: Bonik Barta

How many cases are pending?

About 4.0 million in subordinate courts plus about 0.69 million in the Supreme Court (about 4.7 million),3435 against 4.855 million (unverified: no primary source located; November 2026), 4.74 million (December 2025; unverified) and “47 lakh” (a watchdog).36 The numbers are broadly the same order and differ by date and by what is counted. The Supreme Court is said to have cleared nearly 99,000 cases in the first eight months of 2026 (from a headline).

  • Capacity. About one judge per 78,000 people.37 Five Appellate Division judges are said to carry 41,000 cases (unverified; a watchdog source). Comparisons given: 107 judges per million people in the US and 51 in England (unverified; no primary source located).
  • Contract enforcement. 1,442 days and 66.8% of the claim, 189th in Doing Business 2020.38
  • Prisons. About 74% of prisoners await trial.39
  • Money-loan courts. 72,540 cases worth Tk 1.78 trillion in 2023 (The banking crisis).
  • Control. Lower-court judges remain under executive control after the April repeals.6
  • Land. A ministry official claims about 80% of cases are land-related. That is an official’s claim, not a measured statistic.40
  • Village courts. A pilot in Jashore reports resolution in about 10 days for a Tk 20 fee. It is a single-district promotional evaluation.41
  • Reform legislation. Commercial court legislation reportedly provides 90-day trials, a cap of three adjournments and pre-suit mediation; the monetary threshold and judge capacity are open questions (see the dispute above).42

Police

  • The Police Reform Commission reported bribes of up to Tk 1 million for a constable’s post and said money paid for postings is recovered through bribes.43
  • A government survey found about 62% of people seeking police services paid a bribe.44
  • Stations are underfunded for basic operations, which pushes costs onto the public.45
  • The police are the only institution with more public disapproval than approval; the army has 78% approval (IRI survey).46

The civil service and public services

  • Pay has risen by 100-142% for 2.4 million employees, phased to July 2027 with allowances from 2028, with no conditions attached.4748
  • Some postings cannot be had without payment, and the payment is recovered later.49
  • TIB’s 2025 national household survey found that 81.6% of households experienced corruption in at least one service sector (reference period November 2024 to October 2025; TIB release), and 69.4% of households using law-enforcement services reported it.50 An earlier-cited TIB survey found 70.9% of households faced corruption in services.49 (Different surveys; the results are consistent in order of magnitude.)
  • The single-bid share in e-procurement was 20.7%.51
  • Retired army generals continue to be appointed on contract to chair civilian bodies such as the telecom regulator (a source cited in the note).4
  • In a 2026 study (cited at second hand; unverified), social prestige and job security draw top STEM graduates into the general administrative cadre (BCS). A survey in 2018 found 47% of higher-secondary graduates and above named a government job as their main goal.52

What people say (opinion surveys)

  • IRI polling: corruption is the problem named most often (22%), ahead of drugs (15%).53
  • Jamaat’s favourability slipped from 53% to 48%.54
  • A Doppler poll found 89.4% saying electricity was handled badly, while 78.6% backed the Family Card.55
  • Approval of the government drops sharply among people in financial trouble.56

Student politics and campuses

Student politics are covered here as a governance fact, and the education consequences are on Education and skills.

  • Since August 2024 at least 33 higher-education institutions, including Dhaka University and BUET, have banned party-affiliated student politics. The Chhatra League was banned under the Anti-Terrorism Act in October 2024. A Prothom Alo online survey of about 350,000 people reported about 93% in favour of ending party-affiliated student politics (unverified; no primary source located).5758
  • Other student wings have since repositioned. Chhatra Dal formed committees across all 18 Dhaka University halls in August 2025, and clashes involving Chhatra Dal, elected DUCSU representatives and Islami Chhatra Shibir occurred between April and August 2026.59
  • Public-university halls (“gono rooms”) have packed 15-20 first-years into rooms meant for 4-6, with the ruling party’s student wing controlling seats.58

Existing laws

Bangladesh already has most of the legal instruments: the Anti-Corruption Commission (2004), a constitutional guarantee of judicial independence, the Right to Information Act (2009) and the UN anti-corruption convention. One argument (unverified; no primary source located) is that what is missing is an enforcement equilibrium: laws are used by whichever party holds the state against the outgoing party, and otherwise lie dormant. That is a judgement. What other countries did, and what the comparative literature says, is on History and comparisons.

Gaps

  • Whether the Commercial Courts legislation survived review, and the status of the police commission bill.
  • Party and election finance: no numbers on what elections cost or how parties fund themselves.
  • Press freedom, civil society and the media environment: beyond the RSF rank and the Cyber Security Act, little is documented here.

Surveillance, data and online content

TIB has warned that the Personal Data Protection Ordinance 2025 contains broad surveillance exemptions, that online content controls were added to the Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulation (Amendment) Ordinance 2026, and that repeal of the merit-based Supreme Court Judges Appointment Ordinance 2025 was being considered.60 Safeguards such as judicial warrants for interception are advocated by civil-society groups (Article 19).61


  1. Wikipedia, 2026 Bangladeshi general election; bdnews24, national election 2026. ↩↩↩↩↩↩

  2. Wikipedia, 2026 Bangladeshi constitutional referendum. ↩↩

  3. Al Jazeera, Bangladesh election results 2026. ↩

  4. Refs 1-3, 22, 25, 29: Yunus ministry (Wikipedia), Oxford BSG, ConstitutionNet, TIB, and its ref 25 (listed as a TBS article on reclaiming laundered money, which does not match the claim about retired generals, so that claim is unverified). ↩↩↩

  5. Al Jazeera, Is Bangladesh killing reforms introduced after student-led protests?, 22 April 2026. ↩

  6. Daily Star, Judiciary, NHRC reforms rolled back. ↩↩

  7. Prothom Alo, judicial ordinances. ↩

  8. Prothom Alo, special committee on constitutional reform. ↩

  9. bdnews24, opposition and the five reserved seats. ↩

  10. Financial Express, A year after July Charter signing, key reforms lie in limbo. ↩

  11. Prothom Alo on Human Rights Watch, September laws. ↩↩

  12. TBS/TIB, Even after 18 months, reform pledges remain distant reality. ↩

  13. Dhaka Tribune, Army to return to barracks. ↩

  14. CPD, Six Months of the Government, 24 August 2026. ↩

  15. Ittefaq, 32 ex-DCs sent into compulsory retirement. ↩

  16. TIB (its ref 29) and New Age (ref 126). ↩

  17. BSS, Govt approves Police Commission Ordinance, other laws. ↩

  18. Wikipedia, Article 70 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. ↩

  19. Prothom Alo, op-ed on the caretaker system. ↩

  20. World Justice Project, Bangladesh. ↩

  21. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Police reforms: Bangladesh. ↩

  22. TBS, Pervasive violence, mostly against women and children, marks first half of 2026: ASK. ↩

  23. IANS, Mob violence in Bangladesh driven by mistrust of police. ↩

  24. Daily Star, 97 attacks on shrines since August 2024, only 11 cases filed. ↩

  25. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2026: Bangladesh. ↩

  26. Cato Institute, Human Freedom Index 2025. ↩

  27. Dhaka Tribune, RSF: Bangladesh ranks 152nd in 2026. ↩

  28. TIB, CPI 2025. ↩

  29. Prothom Alo, 13th lowest. ↩

  30. Wikipedia, 2026 Bangladeshi general election. ↩

  31. Human Rights Watch, Bangladesh: 4 arrested for insulting government. ↩

  32. Prothom Alo, 85 jailed after raid. ↩

  33. Dhaka Tribune, Bhatara raid: 85 jailed, but was justice served? ↩

  34. Prothom Alo, pending cases. ↩

  35. Financial Express, Supreme Court clears nearly 99,000 cases in first eight months of 2026. ↩

  36. Constitution Watchdog, 47 lakh pending cases, 5 appellate judges. ↩

  37. Daily Star, Courts grapple with shortage of judges. ↩

  38. World Bank, Doing Business 2020, Bangladesh. ↩

  39. Bonik Barta, prisoners awaiting trial. ↩

  40. TBS, Land ministry moves services online. ↩

  41. UNDP, village courts. ↩

  42. Daily Star, Review the Commercial Court Ordinance 2026. ↩

  43. Prothom Alo, Police Reform Commission on bribes for posts. ↩

  44. Daily Sun, 62% paid a bribe for police services. ↩

  45. Daily Star, police station funding. ↩

  46. Dhaka Tribune on IRI, institutions. ↩

  47. Financial Express, Govt service holders’ basic salary raised by up to 142pc. ↩

  48. Dhaka Tribune, Cabinet approves ninth pay scale proposal. ↩

  49. Daily Sun, TIB survey on corruption in services. ↩↩

  50. TIB, National Household Survey 2025, executive summary. ↩

  51. TIB, e-GP report. ↩

  52. BRAC, youth survey blog (2018 survey). ↩

  53. Dhaka Tribune on IRI, problems. ↩

  54. Dhaka Tribune on IRI, Jamaat favourability. ↩

  55. Prothom Alo, Doppler poll. ↩

  56. Dhaka Tribune on IRI, approval. ↩

  57. Unverified: no primary source located. ↩

  58. The Diplomat, Bangladesh’s student politics: storied history, brutal violence, which reports the 93% online poll and gono rooms. ↩↩

  59. ISAS, From protest to power: BNP, student politics and campus violence in Bangladesh. ↩

  60. TIB, TIB flags rollback of critical judicial and human rights reforms. ↩

  61. Article 19, Bangladesh: restore public trust and reform surveillance practices. ↩

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Where this comes from

Synthesised from 7 research reports, checked against the sources cited above and reviewed before publication. How we work · All sources.